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Quesada: Florida Wage Garnishment: An Anachronistic Remedy

NOTES
FLORIDA WAGE GARNISHMENT: AN
ANACHRONISTIC REMEDY*
One point stands out from our long weary struggle with this case
and that is the complex and confusing state of the law relative to garnishment. It occurs to us that it need not be so and that the whole
subject should have a thorough legislative overhauling.
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORmA'

Consumer credit is big business in America today. While credit was initially
utilized to enhance the sale of merchandise, businesses now use sophisticated
merchandising techniques in order to increase their credit accounts and
thereby, increase their profits from income derived from financed purchases. 2
At least fifty per cent of the adult population of the United States is now
paying on some form of installment credit.3 While most observers readily
agree that credit has been a boon to the economy, it is also apparent that
there are undesirable social aspects that may be incident to expanded credit.4
With an increased use of consumer credit there is a notable increase in
wage garnishments. Municipal courts throughout the country are inundated
with such actions. 5 However, the social consequences of wage garnishments,
such as unemployment, bankruptcy, and the diminution of respect for the
judicial system by a large segment of society are even more significant problems. With an increasing awareness of these problems. Congress and the judiciary have begun to respond by reviewing the statutes and practices that
have been controlling in the area of wage garnishment.6 The result of this
awareness has been reflected in the enactment of the Consumer Credit Protection Act7 and the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation.8 These two developments should
OEvrroR's NoTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in winter 1971 quarter.
1. Nash v. Walker, 78 So. 2d 685, 687 (Fla. 1955).
2. 22 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. 11,

12 (1967). Testimony of David Caplovitz before

committee hearing on "Truth-in-Lending" held by the attorney general of New York. See
also 53 FED. RrsEvE BULL. 2122 (1967). Total consumer installment credit outstanding in
the United States increased from $42.8 billion in 1960 to $76.2 billion in October 1967. Id.
3. See 55 Fm. Rs=vE BULL. at A 54 (Sept. 1969). Consumer debt outstanding rose
to $95.850 billion by July 1969, an increase of $19.6 billion over October 1967. See also
G. KATONA, C. LrNiNGER & E. MuEuRa, 1963 SURvEY OF CONsuMER FINANCES 59, 65 (1964).
4. See, e.g., P. CROWN, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE CONSUMER 16 (1963).

5. See Hearing on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 1036 (1967).
6. See Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1671-77 (Supp. V, 1969) (effective
July 1, 1970). See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§1671-77 (Supp. V, 1969).

8. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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effect sweeping changes in garnishment procedures. However, state action
must be forthcoming in order to implement the federal proscriptions and to
correct the continuing imperfections in existing state garnishment procedures. 9
This note will analyze wage garnishment in Florida in light of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the Sniadach decision, and actual practices as
reflected by data collected from Florida courts. 10 Finally, proposals will be
made in order to suggest methods of facilitating compliance with recent legislation and Supreme Court decisions, alleviating the present caseload of the
courts, and assuring a measure of due process of law to the creditor, employer,
and debtor alike.
WAGE GARNISHMENT

Florida's garnishment provisions are typical of those in other states where
garnishment has not undergone recent substantial revision. A writ of garnishment may issue for one of two principal reasons:" in execution of a judgment; or, where the plaintiff sues for a debt that he alleges to be due and
unpaid, and alleges that the writ applied for is not being sought in order to
injure either the debtor or the garnishee. Moreover, the plaintiff must allege
that he does not believe the defendant has sufficient property in his possession which may be attached, to satisfy the debt. 12
An analytical model is helpful in analyzing the relationships between the
parties involved in a wage garnishment. Essentially, it may be viewed as a
triangle with each side representing a different relationship and each angle

9. Florida as well as other states must reform its statutes in order to solidify the
effects of the Consumer Credit Protection Act and Sniadach. There are present difficulties
in the Florida provision that hinder the enforcement of these new restrictions. See FA.
STAT. ch. 77 (1969). For example, since Florida does not allow a continuing writ of
garnishment, successive writs must be filed for each subsequent pay period. This procedure
will cause difficulty in determining whether a garnishment is for one indebtedness or
several. Hence, the burden will be shifted to employers to determine when there is a
garnishment on more than one indebtedness in order to comply with the provisions of
15 U.S.C. §1674 (Supp. V, 1969), which provides that an employer may not discharge an
employee for garnishment on any one indebtedness. In addition to the burden imposed
upon the employers and the courts by this procedure, it is conceivable that the Department
of Labor, entrusted with the enforcement of §1674, will be deluged with alleged violations
as a result of a misunderstanding. regarding more than one garnishment.
10. See Appendix; Survey of clerks of Florida's circuit courts and civil courts of record.
11. FLA. STAT. §77.03 (1969). See also Gorman Corp. v. Bethell Constr. Co., 77 So. 2d
449 (Fla. 1954).
12. FLA. STAT. §77.031 (1) (1969). While Florida courts had required an additional
averment by the plaintiff stating that the property sought to be garnished or attached "is
not due for the personal labor or services of the head of a family residing in this state,"
Virginia Mirror Co. v. Hall, 181 So. 2d 6, 7 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965), this requirement was
abrogated by the legislature in 1967. The statute now requires the plaintiff to "file a
motion (which shall not be verified or negative defendant's exemptions).
... FLA. STAT.

§77.03 (1969).
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denoting a party who operates in two separate capacities. 3 In such a model
the base line represents the main action on the debt owed to the plaintiff by
4
the defendant and from which the ancillary writ of garnishment is issued.
The right side of the triangle represents the employment relationship. 15 The
left side represents a debtor-creditor relationship between the garnishee employer and the plaintiff creditor who is subrogated to the defendant's rights.16
Only the relationship represented by the left arm of the triangular model,
which provides for suit by the creditor against the debtor's employer, is
treated by Florida's garnishment statutes. The matters involved in the main
action of the creditor against the debtor, as well as the debtor-employee's
relationship with his employer, are left for the court's determination in the
principal suit.17 Therefore, while the garnishment process is founded upon
the debtor-creditor relationship in the principal suit, the actual garnishment
procedure revolves around the artificially created relationship between the
garnishee-employer and the plaintiff-creditor.
In Florida, the writ of garnishment is usually served upon the employer
prior to service of the complaint upon the defendant. 8 At present, there
are no provisions regarding the time of service of the complaint upon the defendant in relation to the time of service of the writ upon the garnishee.
While the complaint and the writ will usually be executed on the same day,' 9
See Note, Garnishment in Florida: Analysis, Assessment, and Proposals, 19 U. F-A.

13.

L. Rav. 99, 100 (1966).
Illustration:

C

(Garnishee-employer)

Debtor-Creditor
Relationship by
Subrogation
(Plaintiff)

Debtor-Creditor Relationship
By Reason of Employment
B

A

(Defendant)

Action on

the main
debt
14.
15.
16.
(1925);
17.

Williams v. T. R. Sweat & Co., 103 Fla. 461, 137 So. 698 (1931).
See Huot, Kelly & Co. v. Ely, Candee &Wilder, 17 Fla. 775 (1880).
Pleasant Valley Farms & Morey Condensery Co. v. Carl, 90 Fla. 420, 106 So. 427
Seaboard Surety Co. v. Acme Wellpoint Corp., 156 So. 2d 688 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
FMA. STAT. §77.04 (1969).

18. See Appendix (6)b. Survey of clerks of Florida's circuit courts and civil courts of
record.
19. FLA. STAT. §77.01 (1969). The statute provides that the right to a writ of garnishment accrues to one who either has sued to recover or has recovered a judgment. Thus,
if no judgment has been recovered at the time of filing the motion necessary for the
issuance of the writ, a complaint must have been filed. In that way the affiant has sued to
recover a debt and complies with the statutory requirerient.
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the employer is normally served first since he is commonly at an established
place of business and service is more easily accomplished. 20 Service upon the
defendant is usually more difficult and often is effected at a later date. 21
Regardless of the time of service of the complaint upon the defendant, service
22
upon the garnishee constitutes an effective freezing of the debtor's wages.

The garnishee must answer for the amount owed by him to the defendant,
if any, and provide information concerning any person indebted to the
defendant.23 However, only those debts that are due without any contingency
at the time of service are within reach of the creditor.24 Under present Florida
statutory law25 and a well-defined line of cases, 26 a writ of garnishment is
required for each new pay period.27 No provision is made for a continuing
2s
writ if the debt owed is larger than the debtor's wages for that pay period.
A Creditor'sSword
Wage garnishment is the principal legal remedy in the creditor's arsenal
of collection devices. 20 Creditors generally maintain that garnishment is primarily important as a coercive device since the threat of wage garnishment
results in the collection of more money than is collected through actual use
of the remedy in the courts. 30 In fact, collection agencies make most of their
20. See Appendix, supra note 18.
21. While no data on this point was available from the Florida courts, a survey in
the state of Washington revealed that in 37 out of 44 garnishment cases, the writ was
served on the employer at least one day before the notice of the suit was served on the
defendant. The median difference between the two dates of service was five days. See Note,
Wage Garnishment in Washington-an Empirical Study, 43 U. WASH. L. REv. 743, 760
n.97 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wage Garnishment].
22. Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 1958). In reply to a questionnaire,
93.7% of the clerks of the Florida courts polled answered that the assets were legally
frozen at the time of the service of the writ upon the garnishee. See Appendix.
23. FLA. STAT. §77.04 (1969).
24. FLA. STAT. §77.06 (1969). Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 1958)
(holding that the garnishee-employer is answerable only for any earnings of the defendant
that were accrued and unpaid at the time the writ was served and "thereafter earned by
defendant, up to the date of the filing of the garnishee's answer, but not beyond that date.")
Such a practice imposes an enormous burden upon the courts, creditors, and employers.
25. FLA. STAT. §77.06 (1969).
26. See, e.g., Cobb v. Walker, 144 Fla. 600, 198 So. 324 (1940); West Florida Grocery
Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1918).
27. Cbaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23, 24 (Fla. 1958).
28. Because the wages due in a particular pay period may not satisfy the debt, the lack
of a continuing writ can result in considerable administrative difficulties for the employer.
See infra note 41. This problem will be particularly acute under the new percentage limitations on disposable earnings that may be garnished. 15 U.S.C. §1673 (Supp. V, 1969). At
present, however, Florida has no restrictions on the portion of a person's wages that may
be garnished. Therefore, the problem of a limited writ will be magnified as the Consumer
Credit Protection Act limitations are imposed. See generally Appendix.
29. See Wage Garnishment,supra note 21, at 749.
30. See, e.g., Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALIw. L. Rzv. 1214, 1229 (1965); Conard, An Appraisal of Illinois Law on the Enforcement of Judgments, 1951 U. ILL. L.F. 96, 100 (1951). See also, Wage Garnishment, supra
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collections without recourse to legal action at all.31 The acute awareness of
garnishment among minority groups,3 2 analysis of factors leading to the filing
of bankruptcy, 33 and the number of people leaving their jobs in fear of
wage garnishment 4 lend credence to such claims of the effectiveness of the
threat of garnishment.
Creditors will usually resort to legal action when methods of informal persuasion fail. The action taken will generally involve garnishment,35 and often
garnishment prior to judgment. 36 Prejudgment garnishment was originally
designed as an extraordinary remedy to be used for the purpose of preventing
a debtor from leaving the jurisdiction.3 7 However, because of the ease with
Which a prejudgment writ may be procured in Florida, 38 the remedy is often
abused and utilized as a coercive tool rather than as an extraordinary remedy
to protect the creditor. Consequently, most creditors favor the present Florida
garnishment laws, arguing that prejudgment garnishment is neccessary in
order to insure a quick and relatively inexpensive method of enforcing collections.3 9

note 21, app. table 5 (revealing that Seattle creditors do not utilize the actual writ of
garnishment to collect money but rather use it as a coercive device).
31. Cf. Wage Garnishment, supra note 21, at 749 (collector survey).
32. Hearings on HiR. 7179 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1966). See also U.S. OrFic OF ECONoMic OrPoRTUNrrY (LEGAL SERvicEs DmsioN), Tim PooR SEEK JusrIC 16 (1967).
33. See L. STABtnL, Tim ExPERiENcE or BANKRUPTCY 7 (1966). See generally Dolphin,
An Analysis of Economic and Personal Factors Leading to Bankruptcy, 18 Bureau of Business and Economic Research (Mich. State U. Graduate School of Business Administration,
Occasional Paper No. 15 (1965)).
34. Cf. Wage Garnishment,supra note 21, at 751 (employer survey).
35. Id. at 795 (collector survey).

36. Id. at 796 (app. table 2).
37. Cf. Note, Wrongful Attachment, 52 IoWA L. Rxv. 543, 547-48 (1966).
38. See text accompanying note 12 supra and FLA. STAT. §77.031 (1969). However, it is
unlikely that most debtors whose wages are garnished prior to judgment are in reality
attempting to leave the jurisdiction. Cf. Wage Garnishment, supra note 21, at 752. Instead,
creditors probably initiate the majority of suits for prejudgment garnishment because that
form of action applies sufficient pressure to bring the debtors into the creditor's office to
arrange a new method of satisfying a debt. Unfortunately, once a debt is in the hands of a
collection agency a debtor seldom escapes by paying the original debt alone. Additional
charges, including attorney fees, collection charges, interest, and service fees may be added
to the original obligation without the supervision of the judiciary (for example, one creditor
added $58 in collection and carrying fees to a $16 debt). See Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1025 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The debtor whose
wages are tied up by a writ of garnishment, and who is in need of money is in no position
to resist demands for collection fees. If the debt is small, the debtor will be under considerable pressure to pay the debt and collection charges in order to get back his wages.
If the debt is large, he will often sign a new contract that includes the additional charges
and fees. However, the main action on the debt will usually be continued to judgment.
Creditors realize that having an enforceable judgment gives them security against the
debtor's defaulting on the renewal obligation. Cf. Wage Garnishment, supra note 21, at 753.
39. Appendix (6)c.
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An Employer's Headache
As Florida's industrial sector grows, the effect of wage garnishment on the
employer will become an increasingly important consideration. Although the
employer may incur substantial expense as a result of wage garnishment, his
interests as the middleman in the garnishment process are often ignored.40 In
some cases, writs of garnishment may be "delivered to big firms in bundles,"'41
42
resulting in expenses that can be quite substantial.
Employers have frequently adopted the policy of discharging an employee
after one garnishment in order to reduce the expenses and nuisance incident
to garnishment procedures. 43 Some employers have adopted more flexible
policies and take into consideration such factors as time of service, financial
need, and family size. 44 Still others have taken more constructive action such
as providing credit counseling to their employees, in order to reduce the
number of garnishments. 5 However, employers must now conform to the
limitations of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which prohibits the discharge of employees for a garnishment on any one indebtedness. 8 Consequently, employers are now under an increased pressure to attempt to find positive
methods of aiding their employees in solving credit problems.
The Debtor's Burden
Garnishment laws have generally been the product of the state's attempt
to achieve a balance between the duty of enforcing the creditor's lawful claims
and protection of the debtor's right to procedural due process. A review of the
effects of wage garnishment, however, reveals that the solution has not always
been satisfactory, especially in the case of the low-income wage earner. Gener40. The United States Supreme Court in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press,
Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 290 (1924), said: "The suggestion that a substantial constitutional right of
the garnishee is impaired because he may be put to some additional expense of bookkeeping
in keeping his account with the judgment debtor is plainly without merit."
41. Hearings,supra note 38, at 1017. E.g., Boeing's Commerdal Airplane Division was
served with over 500 writs per month in Washington alone. See Wage Garnishment, supra
note 21, at 755. The company employed five clerks and a supervisor to check payroll
records and answer the writs. The accounts of those employees whose wages were garnished
were calculated by hand as opposed to the computer procedure normally followed. Such
practices were necessary because a writ frequently catches only a portion of the wages due
in a particular pay period. Washington, like Florida, has no continuing writ of garnishment.
42. Hearings,supra note 38, at 30. Boeing spent over $200,000 in 1967 as a direct result
of garnishment against its employees. Of that amount, $120,000 represented direct expenses
for clerical costs, et cetera, and the balance represented indirect expenses such as loss of
time by employees. Id.
43. See Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions,
8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 535, 565 (1967).
44. Hearings on S.750 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,at 287 (1963).
45. Cf. Wage Garnishment, supra note 21, at 759.
46. 15 U.S.C. §1674 (Supp. V, 1969).
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ally, the employee's wages are garnished before he is served with notice of the
main action, 47 he is unaware of his right to available exemptions, 4 8 and subsequently commits himself to a larger indebtedness in the form of a new contract. 4 9 In most cases, he responds to the claim without seeking the advice of
counsel, which would involve still another expense. These inequities stem
largely from prejudgment garnishment and an over-all lack of information.
To the many families that are dependent upon the immediate use of
wages to buy the staples necessary for subsistence, a temporary freezing of funds
may cause serious harm. Loss of the ability to purchase necessities for one
week is not wholly counterbalanced by the recovery of the funds at some time
thereafter if the creditor's claim is not vindicated.50
The collection of small debts is the most objectionable feature of the
present garnishment system. Regardless of the amount of the debt owed, once
the writ is issued all wages owed to the defendant at the time of service are
encumbered until after judgment. 51 For most wage earners, weekly wages
are their only significant asset.52 Where there are neither savings, friends,
nor relatives to provide support, the loss of wages for even a short time may
be financially crippling. 53 Moreover, if the defendant denies the debt and
has a defense to the claim, which he wishes to assert at trial, he can be expect4
ed to be without his wages for an additional thirty to sixty days or longer.

47. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.

48. FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1969) (exempting the wages of a head of a family from
garnishment).
49. See Hearings,supra note 38, at 1025.
50. Even though most families can obtain necessities without cash by means of credit
arrangements of various kinds, the argument advanced in the text retains considerable
force. There are many wage-earning families with a credit rating so low that no credit is
available. Moreover, many other families will have already reached the limit of credit
available to them. Indeed, for the wage earner whose wages are a likely target of garnishment, credit will be necessarily limited. The plight of the defendant in a wage garnishment
case may be more easily understood through an illustration. Assume that a spurious claim
is brought. Assume further that the defendant must forego, instead of half of his wages,
half of the goods and services for which he normally exchanges them. What can he do
without: housing? groceries? transportation? Surely it is not unrealistic to assume that a
significant number of wage earners - particularly those most susceptible to wage garnishment -have their entire paychecks budgeted in advance. If these goods and services are
not made available to the defendant until months later when his claim is vindicated, they
will hardly be of equal value.
51. Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 1958). See also note 22 supra.
52. Hearings,supra note 38, at 794.
53. It may well mean eviction for failure to pay rent, repossession of a car needed
for transportation to work, arrest for failure to meet support payments, or any number of
hazards that afflict the man who is unable to meet his obligations when due.
54. For example, assume that A is sued by X on a debt of $80. X demands $100
plus interest since 1964. Besides his defense of the statute of limitations of which A is
probably unaware, he has a possible defense of discharge in bankruptcy. A is already two
payments behind on his used car and must travel 20 miles to work each day. The writs
have tied up $200 in A's wages. X will settle for $120 but will not recognize any of A's
defenses. Usually A in such a situation will pay the demanded amount to have his wages
released.
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Florida has attempted to alleviate the severity of wage garnishment upon
the family by providing a complete exemption from wage garnishment for a
person who is the "head of a family residing in the state."- Although it is
difficult to prove a direct cause-and-effect relationship empirically, most authorities agree that there is a negative correlation between the exemption of
wages from garnishment and the rate of personal bankruptcies.5 0 Referees in
bankruptcy have described wage garnishment as "the most important" cause
57
of personal bankruptcies.
As a result of the head of the family exemption from garnishment, Florida
has experienced one of the smallest number of personal bankruptcies among
the fifty states. 58 This would seem to indicate that the exemption has had
desirable social and economic consequences. However, there remains considerable inconsistency in the application of the exemption. While the purpose of the exemption is to assure a debtor's family the necessities of life,5 9
it does not afford protection when the wage earner is divorced but is nonetheless supporting his family.60 Florida does protect the family from an irresponsible supporting spouse,6' but there is no provision to prevent the garnishment of the wages of the divorced debtor who continues to support his
family out of moral or legal obligation. While there is some indication of
judicial recognition of this problem, 62 it will require legislative reform to
correct this flaw in the Florida garnishment process.

55. FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1969). This exemption appears to have proved successful. See
Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALrF. L. REv.
1214, 1234-37 (1965); Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due
Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implication for Related Areas of the Law, 68 MICH.

L. REv. 986, 987 (1970). Figures on bankruptcy filings for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1968, yielded an important comparison between the number of filings in states that have
harsh garnishment laws and the number of filings in those states that prohibit or strictly
limit garnishment of wages.
The states with harsh garnishment laws had the following number of bankruptcy filings
during that year: Alabama 10,214; California 38,327; Colorado 4,306; Michigan 7,492;
Minnesota 3,175; Ohio 17,680; Oregon 4,685; Tennessee 9,384.
The states with mild garnishment law, on the other hand, had significantly fewer filings:
Alaska 208; Florida 1,416; Pennsylvania 1,601; South Carolina 160; South Dakota 182;
Texas 1,30.
56. Hearings, supra note 38, at 794. See also P. BRoSKY, A STUDY OF PERSONAL BANK-

39 (1965); R. MISBACH, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY
(1964).
57. Lee, An Analysis of Kentucky's New Exemption Law, 55 Ky. L.J. 618, 630 (1967);
Snedecor, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy, 35 RE. J. 37, 38 (1961).
58. See note 55 supra.
RUPTY IN THE SEATTLE METROPOLITAN AREA

IN THE

UNITED STATES AND UTAH 33

59. Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353 (1931) (holding that the
purpose of the statute is to preserve to the debtor and his family the means of living
without becoming a charge upon the public).
60. See Healey v. Toolan, 227 So. 2d 55, 56 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
61. FLA. STAT. §61.12 (1969).
62. See Healey v. Toolan, 227 So. 2d 55 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (holding that a husband's exemption from wage garnishment remains in effect regarding a pre-divorce contract for child support).
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FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE LIMITATION ON WAGE GARNISHMENT

Congress, concerned that the exploitation of consumers by unscrupulous
creditors was a contributing cause of such diverse phenomena as consumer
bankruptcies, 63 urban riots, 4 and even suicide,6 5 passed the Consumer Credit
Protection Act 0 (CCPA) to "safeguard the consumer.""7 The constitutional
basis for the Act, as stated in the CCPA, 6 is the necessity for the establishment of uniform banking laws and the regulation of commerce. Factors
advanced in support of the Act include the correlation between the number
of consumer bankruptcies and the harshness of state garnishment laws; 9 the
fact that wage garnishment often results in loss of employment;70 the need to
alleviate the burden on the courts as a result of the overwhelming number of
garnishment cases; 71 and the theory that availability of the remedy promotes
improvident extension of credit on attractive terms to people who are unable
to repay voluntarily.7 2
The wage garnishment provisions of the CCPA, 73 as finally enacted, are
a compromise measure. 74 The Act exempts a minimum of 75 per cent of the
debtor's weekly disposable earnings from garnishment.75 Additionally, it
prohibits an employer from discharging an employee whose wages have been
7
garnished to satisfy any single indebtedness. 6
63. Hearings, supra note 38, at 502. Regarding bankruptcies it was concluded: "As is
well known, there are more consumer bankruptcies today, than in the big depression of

the 1930's. Such personal bankruptcies ... have jumped 240 per cent in the past ten years."
64. Id., pt. 2, at 661: "Numerous newspaper accounts have quoted ghetto residents as
rationalizing the looting on the grounds that they have been victimized and robbed by
the merchants for many years."
65. Gannon, Seizing Pay-Unions, Firms, Lawyers Seek To Curb Garnishing as Its
Incidence Rises, Wall Street J., March 15, 1966, at 1,col. 6, reprinted in Hearings, supra
note 38, pt.1, at 71.
66. 15 US.C. §1671-77 (Supp. V, 1969).
67. Id. §1671 (b).
68. Id. It should be noted that the Act has not been challenged.
69. Hearings,supra note 38, pt. 1, at 419, 506. See also note 55 supra and accompanying
text. Florida's relatively mild garnishment laws correlate well with its rank as one of the
states with the smallest number of bankruptcy filings.
70. Hearings,supra note 38, at 443. The effect of a garnishment can be devastating to
a debtor. Most employers dislike garnishments because of the extra work and cost, and
frequently will discharge an employee after the second garnishment. For a discussion on
the relationship of wage garnishment to job loss, see Kerr, Wage Garnishment Should Be
Prohibited,2 PROSPErauS 371 (1969).
71. Hearings,supra note 38, at 104.
72. Id. at 195, 264, 302.
73. 15 US.C. §§1671-77 (Supp. V,1969).
74. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962 (1968).
75. The Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (a) (Supp. V, 1969) provides
that garnishment may reach the lesser of 25% of the debtor's weekly disposable earnings

or the amount by which his disposable earnings exceed thirty times the current federal
minimum wage.
76. Id. §1674. Section 1674 provides: "(a) No employer may discharge any employee
by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one
indebtedness. (b) Whoever willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined
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Section 1673 - Restriction on Maximum Allowable Garnishment
The thrust of section 1673 of the CCPA is to provide a limitation upon
the portion of a debtor's weekly disposable earnings77 that can be reached
by a creditor. The statutory ceiling is set at the lesser of 25 per cent of disposable earnings or the amount of disposable earnings in excess of 30 times the
federal minimum wage.78 Since the current applicable minimum wage is $1.60
per hour, the latter figure would amount to 48 dollars per week. Thus, the
effect of the limitation is to prohibit garnishment in situations where the earnings in a workweek are 48 dollars or less. The 25 per cent limitation becomes
applicable where disposable earnings are in excess of 64 dollars.7 9
not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
77. The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of any individual
remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amount required by law to
be withheld, 15 U.S.C. §1672 (b) (Supp. V, 1969). For example:
Salary Deductions

Take Home Pay

DisposableEarnings

$150.00
Federal income tax
Soc. Sec. & medicine
Union dues
Health insurance
Total

$17.90
7.19

$150.00
17.90
7.19

25.09

6.00
3.87
34.96

34.96
115.04

124.91

Only those deductions required by law, federal income tax and social security, are deducted from take home pay to arrive at disposable earnings.
78. 15 U.S.C. §1673 (a) (Supp. V, 1969).
79. The following examples help to illustrate the application of §1673 of the CCPA:
Disposable earnings-S60
Section 1673 (a) (1): $60 x 25% = $15 (subject to garnishment)
Section 1672 (a) (2): $60 less 48 (30 hr.x $1.60) - $12 (subject to garnishment)
Since the amount of the employee's earnings that would be subject to garnishment is less
under the provisions of §1673 (a) (2), that subsection will control. Hence, not more than
$12 of the employee's disposable earnings may be garnished in that particular workweek.
Disposable earnings - $90
Section 1673 (a) (1): $90 x 25% = $22.50 (subject to garnishment)
Section 1673 (a) (2): $90 less 48 (30 x $1.60 per hr.) = $42 (subject to garnishment)
Since the amount of the employee's earnings that would be subject to garnishment is less
under the provisions of §1673 (a) (1), that section will be controlling. Therefore, not more
than $22.50 of the employee's disposable earnings may be subjected to garnishment in
that workweek.
The discussion of the applicability of the $48 figure is confined to an employee paid
on a weekly basis. The Secretary of Labor prescribes multiples of the minimum that
are equivalent in effect to the weekly base whenever the employee is paid on a biweekly
or monthly basis. 29 C.F.R. §870.10 (1971). Thus, for biweekly, semi-monthly, and monthly
pay periods the applicable amounts are $96, $104, and $208 respectively instead of the
weekly $48 figure. The multiple of the federal minimum hourly wage equivalent to that
applicable to the disposable earnings for one week is represented by the following formula:
the number of workweeks, or fractions thereof, multiplied by 50 times the applicable
federal minimum wage (presently $1.60). In this formula, a calendar month is considered
to consist of 4.33 workweeks.
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There are three exceptions to the application of section 1673. Section
1673 (b) specifies that the provisions of section 1673 (a) do not apply to: (1)
court orders for support"° of any person; (2) court orders of bankruptcy under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act;81 and (8) debts due for either federal or state taxes.8 2 In addition, those states having garnishment laws determined by the Secretary of Labor to be "substantially similar" to the restrictions imposed by the Act may be exempted from the garnishment provisions
3
of the CCPA.8
To date only two opinion letters have been issued defining the term
"substantially similar."'8 4 In regard to whether a state statute exempting 80
per cent of an employee's earnings was substantially similar, the Wage-Hour
Administrator noted that the state law applied to total earnings while the
relative provisions of the COPA applied to disposable earnings and exempted
75 per cent of those earnings. Since the amount exempted under the state
law would vary directly with such factors as the amount of earnings and
tax status of the employee, it was not possible to determine that the provisions of the state statute would meet the federal standard in every case.
Consequently, the state statute was deemed not to be "substantially similar."8 5
In another opinion,8 6 the Kentucky garnishment statutes 7 was ruled not to be
"substantially similar" because it did not define the term "earnings" and
afforded no basis for deriving the disposable earnings of the debtor. Moreover, the Kentucky statute significantly differed from the self-executing provisions of the CCPA88 by requiring that an exemption from garnishment
be specifically claimed by the debtor.
The definition of "substantially similar" remains unclear and has to
date been couched only in negative terms. When a state statute is not exempted as being substantially similar, the CCPA supersedes only those provisions
of state law that place a lesser restriction on wage garnishment than do the
analogous provisions of the federal law.8 9 Therefore, state statutes must yield
to the provisions of the CCPA when not exempted under the "substantial
similarity" test unless such state statutes are more stringent than the federal
provisions.

80. CCH LAB. L. REP. f30,663, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1099 (July 6, 1970).
The term "support" includes allowances of alimony to a divorced spouse.
81. 11 U.S.C. §21 (Supp. V, 1969).
82. 15 U.S.C. §1673 (b) (Supp. V,1969).
83. U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Federal Wage Garnishment Law (WHPC publication

1279, Washington, D.C., Jan. 1970).
84. CCH LAB. L. REP. ff30,597, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1039 (Jan. 7, 1970);

CCH LAB. L.REP. 30,625, Opinion Letter No. 1062 (March 16, 1970).
85. CCH LAB. L. REP. 130,597, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1039 (Jan. 7, 1970).
86. CCH LAB. L. REP. 130,625, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1062 (March 16, 1970).
87. Ky.REv. STAT. ANN. §427.010 (Supp. 1970).

88. 15 U.S.C §1673 (a) (Supp. V, 1969).
89. CCH LAB. L. REP. 30,624, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1061 <March 16, 1970).
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Section 1674 - Restriction on Dischargefrom Employment by Reason
of Garnishment
The CCPA prohibition of discharge of an employee for any one indebtedness90 has been construed by the Wage-Hour Administrator to mean that an
employee cannot be dismissed because of a single garnishment proceeding.9 '
However, the CCPA does not prohibit discharge if the employer has been
subject to garnishment of the employee's wages by more than one creditor or
a single wage garnishment has been brought for collection of more than one
debt. 92 Essentially, the prohibition of discharge is an attempt to ease the
disruption in employment, production, and consumption that has frequently
93
resulted from garnishment.
Additional protection is offered the debtor by the fact that the restriction
against discharge is renewed with each employment. 94 This seems to be an
equitable ruling since a new employer would not have suffered any inconvenience or expense as a result of a garnishment action against a previous
employer. 95 Additionally, the Administrator has ruled that discharge for a
second garnishment after a considerable period of time has elapsed may be
unlawful since the lapse of time could render the first garnishment an immaterial consideration.- Further, the Act protects an employee who is ordered
to forward certain sums to a designated trustee under employee plans drawn
up by referees in bankruptcy. Such payments cannot be used as an excuse for
discharge because the CCPA defines "garnishment" as "any legal or equitable
procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be
97
withheld for payment of any debt."
These restrictions on discharge notwithstanding, the effectiveness of section
1674 remains to be seen. It is doubtful that such restrictions will produce the
desired effect without substantial employer cooperation and necessary state
statutory reform. It will be difficult, at best, to insure the enforcement of
the restriction. Perhaps widespread public education as to the provisions of
the CCPA will aid in the successful implementation of this program.98

90. 15 U.S.C. §1674(a) (Supp. V, 1969). This provision is an attempt to prevent the
employer from discharging an employee summarily upon a garnishment, thereby increasing
the burden on welfare agencies.
91. CCH LAB. L. REP. 1130,627, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1064 (June 12, 1969).
However, under present Florida law this may entail the service of several writs of garnishment as Florida has no continuing writ.
92. See 15 U.S.C. §1674 (a) (Supp. V, 1969).
93.

See Hearings,supra note 38, at 43.

94. CCH LAB. L. REP. ff30,627, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1064 (June 12. 1969).
95. Id. The previous garnishment may, if known, affect the later employment, of course.
96. Id. However, this seems susceptible to challenge. There have been no actual controversies on this matter as yet. The ruling was merely a reply to a request for an opinion.
97. 15 U.S.C. §1672(c) (Supp. V,1969).
98. Recently, spot commercials on radio and television have been used to inform the
public of the garnishment provisions of the CCPA.
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Effects on Florida Wage Garnishment
Florida garnishment statutes do not contain a limitation on the portion
of a person's wages that may be garnished. 99 The only exemption provided by
Florida law is the "head of a family" exemption of all the wages of the head
of a family residing in the state. 100 Since this applies only to a specific class
of wage earners, the provision does not meet the "substantial similarity test"
required by the CCPA for recognition by the Secretary of Labor.' 0 ' Although
the Florida provision would be a greater restraint on garnishment of those
persons qualifying under it, such a provision is dearly not substantially similar
to section 1673 (a) of the CCPA, which exempts 75 per cent of the wages of
all wage earners.102 Therefore, Florida must abide by the provisions of section 1673 (a) and allow the exemption from garnishment of at least 75 per
cent of a person's wage or 30 times the current federal minimum wage, whichever is greater 02
A survey of the clerks of the Florida circuit courts and civil courts of
record was conducted in conjunction with this note. 0 4 The clerks were asked
to reply to a questionnaire and enclose a copy of the writ of garnishment
used in their jurisdictions.215 The data gathered from the survey indicated
that a majority of the circuits responding in Florida have included the limitations imposed by section 1673 (a) in their standardized forms for writs of
garnishment.200
The regional office of the Department of Labor has sent a directive to
all Florida courts informing them of the restrictions of the CCPA.107 On the
basis of the number of circuits that are now including the section 1673 (a)
restrictions in their writs and the letter sent by the Department of Labor, it
can be concluded that all Florida courts are aware of the CGPA restrictions.
However, the data is insufficient to determine whether the remaining circuits are enforcing the Act.108
Florida's garnishment laws do not contain provisions dealing with employee dismissal subsequent to a single garnishment comparable to section

99. See generally FLA. STAT. § §77, 222 (1969).
100. FI." STAT. §222.11 (1969).

101. See Wage-Hour Opinion Letter Nos. 1039, 1062, note 84 supra and accompanying
text.

102. See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text.
103. 15 U.S.C. §1673 (a) (Supp. V, 1969). See also notes 73-79 supra.
104. See Appendix.
105. The clerks were also asked to identify the step in the garnishment procedure at

which the wages of the employee were frozen. Additionally, they were asked for suggestions
that would lighten the case load of the courts.
106. Sixteen of Florida's 20 judicial circuits replied (80%). Many circuits were represented by responses from the various counties contained within the circuit. All but the
8th, 13th, 15th, and 16th circuits were represented. See Appendix.

107. Copies of this directive were forwarded by various clerks with form writs in
response to the survey.
108. In most cases, these circuits did not submit form writs, and therefore it is not
dear whether they are enforcing the provisions of the Act.
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1674 (a). This provision will, therefore, have an even greater impact upon
the Florida garnishment process than the maximum garnishable wage restrictions. 0 9 For the vast majority of Florida employers the CCPA will come
as an entirely new situation to which they must adapt themselves. It remains
to be seen, however, whether such adaptation will take the form of positive
action intended by Congress.O °
Two points become dear upon examination of the present Florida garnishment provisions. First, no point of reference exists from which disposable
earnings may be calculated." The absence of such provisions was fatal to
the Kentucky garnishment statute" 2 when that state sought exception from
the CCPA."13 Second, Florida garnishment statutes contain no percentage
limitations on maximum garnishable wages. While Florida statutes do provide for a "head of family" exemption,"- this does not apply to all persons
as do the provisions of the CCPA."-1 This difference between Florida law and
-the CCPA is also analogous to the Kentucky case, although the Florida
situation appears to be even more inconsistent with the CCPA standard."86
In the opinion issued on the Kentucky statute, the Administrator ruled that
since the Kentucky exemption provisions were not self-executing but required
specific claims of exemption by a defendant, the provisions were not substantially similar to the provisions of the CCPA."1 In addition to being applicable
to the limited class determined to qualify as the "head of a family," Florida
laws similarly require the garnished employee to claim his exemption by
making an affidavit concerning his status" l s Consequently, it is clear that
Florida will be unable to gain exemption under the substantial similarity
test. These findings lead to the conclusion that there must be substantial
revision of Florida's present statutory framework in order to comply with
federal standards.
JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON WAGE GARNISHMENT -

THE Sniadach CASE

In 1969 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corporation.'9 The Court held the interim freezing of
109. See 15 U.S.C. §1673 (a) (Supp. V, 1969).
110. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962 (1968).
111. Cf. CGH L.aB. L. REP. 130,625, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1062 (March 16,
1970).
112. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §427.010 (Supp. 1970). The Kentucky statute is much closer
to the provisions of the CCPA than Florida provisions. It contains an exemption from
garnishment of 75% of earnings. Its failure was that earnings are not equivalent to disposable
earnings. See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
113. See CCII LAB. L. REP. f30,625, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1062 (March 16,

1970).
114. FA. STAT. §222.11 (1969).
115. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
116. See CCH LAB. L. REP. ff30,625, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1062 (March 16,
1970).

117. Id.
118. FLA. STAT. §222.12 (1969).
119. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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wages "absent notice and a prior hearing" violative of the "fundamental principles of due process."'120 The case arose in Wisconsin, which allowed prejudgment garnishment under a statute1 21 similar to Florida's prejudgment
garnishment provision. 122 Weighing the desirability of a final adjudication
prior to the deprivation of a person's property against extraordinary situations requiring special protection for a state or creditor interest,123 the Court
concluded that wage garnishment without a hearing is violative of consti24
tutional requirements of due process.
Essentially, the Court focused on "the right to be heard"' 25 in order to
protect one's property and the special nature of the property right involved
in the garnishment of wages. 26 Addressing itself to the requirements for a
hearing, the Court reflected upon the nature of wages and held that when
property that is vital to everyday life is involved, a hearing on the merits'27
is necessary before the property may be legally frozen. In such a hearing a
creditor would have to establish the validity or probable validity of his
claim against the defendant.12 The Court emphasized the unique character
of a person's wages and the excessive hardship that can result when earnings
are withheld from those who depend upon them from week to week for their
1
necessities. 29

120. Id. at 342.
121. Wis. STAT. ANN. §267.02 (Supp. 1970).
122. Compare FLA. STAT. §77.031 (1) (1969), with Wis. STAT. ANN. §267.02 (Supp. 1970).
123. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
124. Id. at 342.
125. Id. at 339 (citing Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962)). The Court
relied on this principle at least as early as 1863 when, in Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (IWall.)
223 (1863), it held that a discharge under a state insolvency law was ineffective against an
out-of-state creditor: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and
an opportunity to make his defence." Id. at 233. Since that time, notice and an opportunity for a hearing have frequently been held to be fundamental requirements of procedural due process. See, e.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944):
"The fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such
notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional
protection is invoked." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US. 306, 313
(1950): "Mhe Due Process Clause .. . at a minimum . . . require[s] that deprivation of

life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case."
126. 395 U.S. at 340.41.
127. Id. at 343. The majority did not discuss the nature of the hearing required. However, Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, suggested that such hearings must deal with the
merits of the creditor's claim.
128. Id. See also Mulane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941); United States v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457, 463 (1934); Landover v. City & County of Denver, 210

U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908).
129. 395 U.S. at 340-41.
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The Sniadach Exceptions
In Sniadach the Court indicated that due process would be satisfied in
proceedings to seize products without a hearing, 30 or proceedings to attach
property of a resident"31 or a nonresident" 2 defendant prior to judgment."33
Additionally, the Court sanctioned proceedings in which a receiver was appointed prior to a finding of misconduct 34 and in which the stockholders of
an undercapitalized corporation were assessed without a hearing. 35
Two factors probably influenced the approval of those summary procedures. First, the proceedings were used by an officer or agency of the state
for the welfare of the general public. A "compelling state interest" was
relatively easy to find in such cases. Second, in none of the cases was there
pressure on the victim of the attachment to forego his opportunity for a
hearing. The property attached was not crucial for day-to-day living, and
the parties attached were not likely to be poor, uneducated, or lacking legal
assistance. The garnished parties owned property, held stock, or ran commercial enterprises and generally were the type of individuals who were able
to utilize available defenses in order to have their property returned. Lower
federal court decisions following Sniadach have distinguished the cases cited
by the Court and have continued to apply Sniadach where property essential
to daily subsistence is seized without notice and a hearing.136 Therefore,
the Sniadach requirement of notice and hearing prior to garnishment of
wages dearly precludes the continued use of prejudgment garnishment. Since
wages are of a different nature than other types of property and are especially
essential to the low-income wage earner, the Sniadach exceptions do not
restrict application of the Sniadach due process requirements in the area
of wage garnishment.

130. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947); McKay v. Mcnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett,
277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). In Ewing the Court found that
the seizure of the products was merely a statutory prerequisite to the action and that the
claimant had a right to a hearing and thus there was no violation of due process. In
Fahey the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration had named a receiver to take possession of a savings and loan association prior to a hearing to determine the validity of
the Administration's charges of misconduct. The Court held the summary procedure valid
on the ground that the impossibility of preserving credit during an investigation would
frustrate the interest of the savers. The facts in Coffin Bros. and Ownbey were substantially
similar in nature and the Court found such procedures to be in compliance with due process
requirements.
131. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
132. McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
133. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
134. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
135. Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
136. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 724 (N.D.N.Y.
1970) (distinguishing the cases cited by the Court as complying with due process).
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Implications of Sniadach for Other Forms of Attachment and Garnishment
Prejudgment seizures may be divided into three categories: attachment
or garnishment of tangible real and personal property, garnishment of intangibles, and foreign attachment. With regard to the first of these categories,
the chief public interests in favor of summary seizure of tangible real and
personal property are the promotion of the extension of credit and assurance
of a fund from which to collect valid claims.137 In order for a court to hold
that prejudgment attachment of tangible property is a constitutional deprivation of a defendant's protected property interest, it must be persuaded that
the debtor's interests outweigh the alleged public interest supporting seizure.3 8
At least one court has indicated its unwillingness to determine such a question in the absence of a specific factual context. 3 9 Although the Supreme
Court of California has held in two cases that its prejudgment wage garnishment procedures were not in compliance with the requirements of procedural
due process,"-o it has refused to decide a case in which the state attorney
general sought to have all prejudgment attachments declared unconstitutional.1 4'
However, a three-judge federal district court in New York has applied
Sniadach to seizure of property under a state replevin procedure, which did
not require a hearing.'d 2 The court held prejudgment seizure of chattels
without a hearing to be an unconstitutional denial of due process. 4 3 Thus, it
is apparent that attachment or garnishment of tangible property prior to a
hearing will be held to be violative of procedural due process whenever the
44
property seized is property that is important to the debtor's daily life.
The second category of prejudgment seizure concerns the garnishment
of intangible assets. Sniadach established the rule that wages, one form of
intangible assets, can be garnished only after the defendant has had an
opportunity to appear and contest the validity of the debt.145 Sniadach should
137. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1967).
138. Id.
189. People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 126, 83 Cal. Rptr.

670 (1970).
140. Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669. (1970);
McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
141. In People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 126, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 670 (1970), the court held that since the case presented neither a party in interest nor
a concrete set of facts, the attorney general's complaint constituted a request for an advisory opinion.
142. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). But see
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
143. 315 F. Supp. at 725.
144. "Beds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables and other necessities for ordinary day-today living are, like wages in Sniadach, a 'specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system,' the taking of which on the unilateral command of an
adverse party 'may impose tremendous hardships' on purchasers of these essentials." La-

prease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
145. The Supreme Courts of Arizona and California have recently held, on the basis

of Sniadach, that prejudgment garnishment is unconstitutional. Termplan, Inc. v. Superior
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be controlling in cases where intangible funds are the defendant's sole or primary liquid assets and are garnished prior to a hearing. In such instances, the
debtor's significant interest in the use of the funds is not outweighed by the
public interest in debt collection and economic expansion.14 6 Thus, in general, prejudgment garnishment of intangible assets denies a defendant due
process when the defendant has both an immediate expectation of, and an
4
immediate need for, the garnished fund.1 7
The third category of prejudgment attachment is that involving the immediate seizure of a defendant's property for the purpose of establishing
quasi in rem jurisdiction when the defendant resides outside the court's
territorial jurisdiction. Quasi in rem jurisdiction extends to any attachable
tangible or intangible property of the defendant that is located in the forum
state.1 48 This method of obtaining jurisdiction over a debtor has been accepted with rare exception as a valid means of maintaining a judgment
against a nonresident.1 49 Since due process requires the plaintiff to give
adequate notice of his action to the defendant,1 50 and the garnishee as a
practical matter must also notify the defendant of the garnishment proceeding,' 5' the Sniadach rule would appear to have little applicability in
this area. In addition, the sort of property attached for quasi in rem purposes is usually tangible and seldom would 52fall into the "daily necessity"
category of assets protected under Sniadach.

Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463, P.2d 68 (1969); Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. Sd 903, 464 P.2d 125,
83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 8d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1970). In Termplan, however, the court carefully limited its decision to wage garnishment.
146. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in a recent opinion based on Sniadach, held
unconstitutional the prejudgment garnishment of bank accounts. Larson v. Fetherston, 44
Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). The court included in its opinion dicta to the effect
that all prejudgment garnishments violate the due process clause: "[W]e think that no
valid distinction can be made between garnishment of wages and that of other property."
Id. at 718, 172 N.W.2d at 23.
147. Resolution of this situation by statute will be most difficult. One solution may
be to provide the defendant with notice at the same time it is provided to the garnishee,
and allow the release of the garnished fund upon the defendant's showing that he meets
the criteria for the exception.
148. The location of such an intangible is any place at which the garnishee is subject
to in personam jurisdiction. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). See also Ownbey v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921).
149. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). See also Harris v. Balk, 198 US. 215
(1905).
150. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
151. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
152. Property seized for quasi in rem purposes generally is not the Sniadach type of
asset. "Daily necessity" property would probably be secured by the defendant prior to
leaving the jurisdiction. In addition, considering the breadth of most state long-arm
statutes, in personam jurisdiction usually will be obtained over a defendant who has
had any substantial contact with the forum. Cf. Note, In Personam Jurisdiction-Florida's
Short Long Arm, 23 U. FiA. L. REV. 336 (1971).
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The Effect of Sniadach on FloridaWage Garnishment
The Florida statute that provides for prejudgment wage garnishment has
no provision for a hearing in which the defendant may challenge the alleged
debt before the interim freezing of his assets. 1 53 In the survey of the clerks
of the circuit courts of Florida, 93.7 per cent of those responding answered
that the procedural step at which the wages are effectively frozen is the time of
service of the writ of garnishment upon the employer. 154 The practical result
is that a defendant often is not served with notice of the complaint and summons in the principal action until after the writ of garnishment has been
served upon the garnishee.155 This procedure clearly offends the notice requirements established in Sniadach and constitutes a violation of procedural
due process applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.1 5 6
Data compiled in Florida indicated: (1) the defendant often is not served
with the complaint in the main action until after service of the writ upon
the garnishee; 157 (2) there is no opportunity for a hearing afforded the
defendant before the freezing of his wages; 158 (3) a debtor's wages are frozen
immediately upon service of the writ on the employer1 59 and (4) a number
of Florida's circuit courts are not including the CCPA restrictions in their
form writs.,10 Consequently, Florida is denying its residents due process of
law by failing to afford proper notice and hearing prior to the freezing of
wages of alleged debtors. Moreover, Florida has not acted either to enforce
the provisions of the CCPA or to reform its statutes in order to gain an exemption under the Act. It is obvious there is an immediate need for statutory
reform.*
SUGGEsTED RYoRm

The impact of abolishing wage garnishment completely has not been

documented.1 61 Such a proposition could possibly result in the replacement of
current social and legal problems with others 62 of perhaps greater magnitude.
Hence, rather than abolishing wage garnishment completely, an attempt must
153.

See FLA. SrAT. §77.031 (1969).

154.
155.
156.
157.

See Appendix (5).
See generally Appendix and note 21 supra.
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 338 (1969).
See Appendix (6)b.

158. Id. (4).
159. Id. (5); FLA. STAT. §77.06 (1969).

160. Appendix (3). This statistic is incomplete since all circuits did not return a form

writ.
,,EDrroR's NoTn: Other statutes providing for garnishment of wages prior to judgment
have been declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp.
1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio
1971).
161. Hearings,supra note 38, at 433.
162. For example, if garnishment is abolished, it is highly probable that creditors will

further restrain the extension of credit. See Wage Qarnihmnt, supra note 21, at 771-75.
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be made to reform present law. Since Florida garnishment procedures are not
substantially similar to the CCPA,163 Florida must enact legislation either
adopting the provisions of the CCPA or establishing similarly stringent restrictions on the garnishment of wages. Such reform cannot be left to court
enforcement of the existent provisions of the CCPA. Even a superficial review of present Florida judicial implementation of the requirements of
Sniadach 64 impels the conclusion that reform simply cannot be left to judicial discretion. 165 Remedial legislation such as Florida's "head of a family
exemption"'16 6 can be utilized as a basis for solving the problems connected
with Florida's wage garnishment provisions. However, significant positive
legislative action must be taken to expand present law to provide the substantive and procedural protections now required.
Abolition of Wage GarnishmentBefore Judgment
Florida statutes, section 77.031, when utilized to effect wage garnishment
provides no opportunity for a debtor to be heard and is contrary to procedural due process requirements as set forth in Sniadach. Present procedures may have a coercive effect upon debtors-causing them to forego the
assertion of valid defenses in order to retain a steady income. Section 77.031
must either be repealed or substantially amended if it is to conform to present federal standards. The following amendment is proposed as an alternative
to abolition or repeal and a satisfactory method of compliance with present
needs and conditions:
This subsection shall not apply to the garnishment of wages, salary,
commissions, or bonuses as compensation for personal services.
An amendment to this effect would not preclude prejudgment garnishment
of tangible or intangible personal property that is not in the nature of wages.
However, it would protect the debtor's expectation interest in property
necessary for normal subsistence, as required by Sniadach.
Continuing Writ of Garnishment
One problem with present Florida garnishment procedures is the limited
effect of a writ of garnishment. 6 7 Florida statutes, section 77.06, provides
that the writ, when served, renders the garnishee liable for any debt due by
him to the defendant at the time of service or at any time between service and

163. See text accompanying notes 111-118 supra.
164. See Appendix (4)- (6).
165. While Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), was decided in June
1969, the vast majority of the courts of Florida were allowing procedures violative of
Sniadach in Dec. 1970.

166. FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1969).
167. See Appendix 6 (a).
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the time of the garnishee's answer. 68 The Florida supreme court has interpreted this to mean that a writ attaches only those assets owed without contingency by the garnishee to the defendant and not those that may become
due at a future date.169 This poses particular problems in the garnishment
of wages since normally they do not become due until the lapse of specified
pay periods. Under present Florida law, several writs of garnishment may be
needed to garnish one debt if the debt exceeds the pay due the defendant for
the period within which the garnishee is served. Hence, the following
provision is proposed:
Service of the writ shall make the garnishee liable for all debts due by
him to defendant and for any tangible or intangible Personal property of
defendant in the garnishee's possession or control. Such writ shall have
continuingeffect upon any debts, tangible or intangible personal property,
which shall become due to defendant by the garnishee after the service of
such writ. However, at the time such property or debts that have been
garnished shall have become sufficient in value to satisfy the judgment,
such writ shall be of no effect.
Wage Exemption
Florida statutes, section 222.11, provides a complete exemption from the
garnishment of wages for persons who are the "head of a family residing in
the state." While its purpose is to protect a debtor's family by securing an
uninterrupted income for the family with which necessities may be purchased,
it does not protect the family when the supportive spouse is divorced. Moreover, Florida has made no provision to comply with the requirements of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. 70 In order to rectify both of these conflicts
in Florida law, the following provision is proposed:
(1) Disposable earnings shall mean that part of the earnings of any
individual remaining after the deduction for federal income tax and social
security but before all other deductions.
(2) The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an
individual that is subject to garnishment may not exceed 25 per centum
of his disposable earnings for that week or the amount by which his disposable earnings exceed thirty times the current federal minimum hourly
wage, whichever is less.
CONCLUSION

The adoption of these provisions or those of a similar nature will rectify
the four most significant defects in Florida garnishment procedures: the
168. See FLA. STAT. §77.04 (1969) (requiring a garnishee to answer within 20 days).
169. Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 1958).

170.

15 U.S.C. §1673 (a) (Supp. V, 1969).
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failure to comply with procedural due process, the lack of a continuing writ,
the failure to offer equal protection to a wage earner's family regardless of
marital status, and a need for compliance with or exemption under the provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Reform has become mandatory in order for Florida to comply with federal statutory and judicial
requirements. The statutes herein proposed are designed to initiate necessary
compliance as well as to remedy problems brought to light by the clerks and
attorneys of the Florida judicial system. Fair and just garnishment procedures
will not only assure due process of law, but will also aid the availability of
credit and thereby benefit the economy of the state.
A. AUGusT QuEsADA

APPENDIX
A questionnaire was distributed, in connection with this note, to the clerks of the
Florida circuit courts and civil courts of record. They were asked to identify the procedural
steps involved in the freezing of the wages of an employee by garnishment in their jurisdictions. In addition, the clerks were asked to identify in chronological order the procedural
steps involved in the wage garnishment process. They were requested to submit any
form writs used in their jurisdictions and to offer any suggestions as to problems that
they perceived in the present garnishment procedures.
Sixteen of Florida's twenty judicial circuits responded as well as several civil courts
of record. Many of these circuits were represented by replies from the various county divisions contained within the particular circuit. Of the total 67 questionnaires sent to
the clerks of each county division, 53 responses were received.
The clerks as well as several attorneys who learned of the project offered many suggestions with respect to perceived defects in the Florida framework and solutions to these
problems. Several clerks forwarded material distributed by the Secretary of Labor In
connection with the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
The following statistical distribution of information was compiled as a result of the
responses received:
(1) Number of responses: 16 of 20 circuits- 80% response
(2) Total percentage of clerks responding. 53 of 67 questionnaires returned - 78%
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(5) Circuits that include the CCPA restrictions in form writs issued by the clerks:
(a) 10 of 16 circuits included CCPA restrictions- 62%
(b) 3 of 16 circuits did not include CCPA - 19%
(c) Others did not return a form writ and therefore information was inadequate.
However, letters from the office of the Secretary of Labor indicate that all courts
have been apprised of the new restrictions.
(4) Circuitsindicatingwhether an answer by defendant is required:
(a) 13 of 16-no answer required- 81%
(b) Other circuits related information from which no conclusion as to the requirement
of an answer could be determined.
(5) Indication of proceduralstep at which assets are frozen:
(a) Frozen upon service of the writ upon the garnishee - 15 of 16-93.7%
(b) Other circuits responded in uncertain terms.
(6) Additionally, the following criticisms were offered by several clerks:
(a) Seven clerks stated that the lack of a continuing writ in Florida imposes a burden
upon both the courts and the employer.
(b) Three clerks in alluding to Sniadach stated that, as a practical matter, the writs
of garnishment were normally served before the complaint because of the difficulty
in locating the defendant relative to the facility with which an employer can
be served.
(c) Four clerks replied that creditors with whom they had contact had expressed the
view that garnishment is necessary in order to insure a quick and relatively inexpensive method of enforcing collections. These four clerks concurred in that
opinion. A tabular breakdown follows:

County
Division

Miami
Brevard
Okaloosa
Santa Rosa
Pinellas
Flagler
Volusia
Dade
Brevard
Seminole
Indian River
Collier
Hendry
Lee
Orange
Jefferson
Sarasota
Wakulla
Nassau
Okeechobee

Circuit

Civil Court
of Record
Civil Court
of Record
1st
1st
6th
7th
7th
l1th
18th
18th
19th
20th
20th
20th
9th
2nd
12th
2nd
4th
19th

CCPA
Restrictions
Included
on Writ

Answer
Required
by Defendant Before
Freezing
of Assets

Point of
Freezing
of Assets

Yes

No

Service of writ

Yes

No

Service of writ

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
?
?
?
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
?
?
?

Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
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